Showing posts with label Tip O'Neill. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tip O'Neill. Show all posts

Saturday, June 24, 2017

The Night the Lights Went Out in Georgia



Unless you've been hiding under a rock, you must know that there was a special election in Georgia's Sixth Congressional District this week.

The district has been in Republican hands for nearly 40 years.

Democrats have been eager to anoint the new House majority that they expect after the midterm elections in 2018, and every special election to fill a vacancy that was created when President Trump tapped someone to join his administration has been billed as a preview of coming attractions. After Democrat Jon Ossoff grabbed 48% of the vote in April's so–called "jungle primary" in the Georgia Sixth, millions of Democrat dollars flowed into the district from out of state, much of it from as far away as San Francisco, for the June 20 runoff.

There were high expectations. As it was in most of last year's Republican presidential primaries, Trump has emerged the winner in every special election so far. The margins have been narrow, but close doesn't count. Democrats were hungry for a victory.

And Democrats, who have gone into each contest convinced that public resistance to Trump and the Republicans was just waiting to rise up and be counted, are sounding like the fabled boy who cried "Wolf!"

They have awfully short memories.

I don't know if Tip O'Neill was the first to say "All politics is local," but I know he used the phrase as the foundation of his campaign strategy — and he knew what he was talking about.

O'Neill, a Democrat and five–term speaker of the House, represented a House district in Massachusetts for more than 30 years and rarely faced a serious challenge when he ran for re–election. In that sense, there was nothing particularly remarkable about his re–election in 1982.

But it was only two years, after all, since Ronald Reagan's landslide victory over Jimmy Carter, and the presidency wasn't the only thing the Democrats lost. After more than a quarter of a century of being in the majority in the Senate, Democrats had lost that majority, and their majority in the House was drastically reduced — by nearly three dozen seats. To say there was a certain amount of anxiety among Democrats at that time would be an understatement.

There needn't have been.

The elections in 1982 were the midterms of Reagan's first term as president — and a clear pattern of American political history is that midterms in general almost always favor the out–of–power party. We've grown accustomed in recent times to the possibility that a president's party might not lose ground in one or both of the chambers of Congress in a midterm election, but that is a rare phenomenon that usually requires unique circumstances.

George W. Bush's Republicans, for example, benefited in 2002 from the national mood following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, winning two Senate seats and eight House seats. It was the first time in nearly 70 years that a president's party gained ground in both chambers of Congress in a midterm election.

You have to go back to the 1930s — when America was in the grip of the Great Depression — to find the previous example of a time when the president's party prospered in both chambers in a midterm election. In 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democrats picked up 10 Senate seats (at a time when there were only 96 members of the Senate) and nine House seats. (FDR's midterms of 1938 and 1942 went against the president's party, and what would have been his fourth midterm, which he did not live to see, was a total disaster for his successor, Harry Truman, in 1946.)

While 9/11 is often compared to Pearl Harbor, FDR did not benefit the way Bush did 60 years later. In the 1942 midterms FDR's Democrats lost nine Senate seats and 45 House seats. In spite of what had happened in Hawaii less than a year earlier, voters were anxious about American involvement in World War II.

In the last century, a few presidents have seen their party make midterm gains in one chamber but not both.

Bill Clinton's Democrats benefited in 1998 from a national backlash against the Republicans' partisan impeachment proceedings. They neither won nor lost seats in the Senate, but they won four seats in the House.

Richard Nixon's Republicans lost 12 House seats but won two Senate seats in the midterms of 1970. There was still a certain amount of backlash against the Vietnam War and the Democrats' participation in its escalation.

In 1962 John F. Kennedy's Democrats gained ground in the Senate but lost ground in the House. The Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred a few weeks before the election, may well have played a role.

In 1914, Woodrow Wilson's Democrats gained five seats in the Senate but lost a staggering 59 seats in the House. The Republicans were more united than they had been in 1912 — when the party's two factions, led by former Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft in the 1912 presidential election, reunited with a common purpose. They also gave themselves pats on the back for the booming economy — the result, they told the voters, of policies passed by Republicans in the previous quarter of a century.

Eight years before that, Teddy Roosevelt's Republicans gained seats in the Senate but lost seats in the House (although they retained a significant majority).

I could go on, but you get the idea, don't you? (Those were the best midterm years for incumbents in the last 110 years, and, in 2017, Democrats have seen the special elections to replace members of the House who were picked to join the Trump administration as targets of opportunity. Sort of a kickoff to the resounding rejection they are certain Republicans will receive next year. Only one real problem with that line of thinking — Republicans have won every special election this year. If you want to have a revolution, you have to have some victories.)

But back to O'Neill.

Even with that history, Democrats were edgy heading into the 1982 midterms. And O'Neill, facing a challenge from a Massachusetts lawyer whose campaign was being financed by out–of–state contributors (primarily oil interests in Oklahoma and Texas), emphasized that point in his campaign.

In November O'Neill won with 75% of the vote, and Democrats recaptured more than two dozen seats in the House, padding the majority they had held since 1955.

But going into that election year, Democrats were anxious. They had taken a beating two years earlier, and, even though O'Neill had won 15 straight congressional races, he was a consummate politician who knew all too well that Massachusetts — the only state to reject Nixon's bid for a second term in 1972 — had voted (narrowly) for Reagan in 1980 (Massachusetts voted for Reagan again in 1984). Was it a symptom of an emerging shift to the right in a state long known for its liberal politics?

Reagan's approval rating in late 1982 was hovering around 40%. It went up when the economy started roaring back to life, but that was after the midterms.

In hindsight it is easy to see the uphill climb that was facing the Republicans in 1982, but it wasn't so easy to see from ground level at the time.

O'Neill took the campaign to the voters. The people who are backing the Republican in this race, he told the voters, don't live here, but they think they can tell you what to do. And he addressed the district's kitchen–table concerns while his opponent — and his opponent's backers — spoke about more national themes.

Does that sound familiar? Democrats wanted to make the Georgia election about cultural issues. The Republicans and their candidate, Karen Handel, wanted to make it about the issues that affected the daily lives of Georgians — taxes and jobs.

On top of that, Ossoff didn't even live in the district.

It wasn't surprising that he received about the same share of the vote that he received in the first vote.

Many Democrats were fooled into believing Ossoff had a good chance to win by his showing in that first vote. The previous congressman, now–Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price, was re–elected there last year with more than 61% of the vote. Ossoff already had done better than any of Price's challengers.

Except in his first election.

Price needed a runoff to win the GOP nomination when his predecessor, now–Sen. Johnny Isakson, decided to run for the Senate. After winning the runoff, Price was unopposed in the general election. He won all his re–election bids without breaking a sweat.

And that is really what is so deceptive about special elections. They are held to fill vacancies — which means there is no incumbent.

Incumbents are notoriously difficult to defeat. They have all the advantages of incumbency at their disposal. Their primary obligation is to be aware of and responsive to the needs of a typically concentrated geographical area. As long as they do that, they tend to win re–election with little trouble.

The best chance to "flip" a House district usually comes when the seat is open.

I have heard all the talk of how Handel will face another tough challenge when she seeks a full term next year, but as long as she keeps her focus on her district, I predict that she will win re–election easily.

It's the way it is.

Thursday, June 12, 2014

All Politics Is Local



The late Tip O'Neill is often quoted as saying that. I don't know if he did or not — but he did write a book that had that as part of its title so I assume he must have said it at least once.

Whether it originated with him or not, it is about the truest statement about politics, particularly the care and feeding of House districts, that you will ever hear.

And I believe it holds the key to the historic primary in Virginia in which Eric Cantor, the House majority leader, was beaten by a Tea Party–backed economics professor.

Clearly, when a seven–term congressman who holds the position of House majority leader and has his eyes on the House speakership is denied renomination, there will be many attempts to explain what happened. A House majority leader is not rejected by his constituents every election, and I believe this is the first time that a House majority leader has lost a party's primary.

It is historic.

In the last couple of days, the most prominently mentioned causes of Cantor's loss that I have heard are (1) the Tea Party is back and has seized the Republican Party, and (2) this was anti–immigration backlash.

Let's examine both of these suggestions — and, as we do, let's look at the results of another primary election conducted on the same day in South Carolina, where Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham easily defeated six challengers.

First, the assertion about the Tea Party.

I really get tired of hearing the Tea Party referred to as if it is an actual political party. It is not. It is a grassroots movement, not really different from the "Occupy Wall Street" movement on the left.

In the aftermath of Cantor's loss, I have heard the Tea Party mentioned as if it had thrown its enormous political heft into the campaign and crushed Cantor. To be sure, there are some national Tea Party organizations that do promote certain candidates and make an effort on their behalf — but, from what I have heard, nothing like that happened in Virginia. Some Tea Party sympathizers favored Cantor's challenger, but there was no coordinated effort that I have seen.

Perhaps Tea Party groups wanted to jump into the race — but no one thought Cantor could be defeated.

The thing that seems to shock people the most is the huge advantage Cantor enjoyed in campaign funds. He spent millions; his opponent, it is said, spent about what Cantor's campaign staff spent in steakhouses.

My guess is that particular revelation sent shockwaves through Republican incumbents — but it should have been a cautionary tale for Democrats, too. Neither side is immune to the illusion that a monetary advantage will always win an election. This time, though, it wasn't about who spent the most.

Nor, I think, was it about immigration. Cantor is conservative, but he supported a pathway to citizenship, and some have suggested his loss was due to backlash on immigration.

It is true that some of the voters in Virginia's Seventh District voted against Cantor on the basis of immigration, but from what I have been reading and hearing from reporters on the ground, that wasn't the most significant issue for most voters.

That hasn't kept immigration reform from taking the blame.

The Breitbart News Network says it was a "referendum against amnesty."

The Washington Post and Miami Herald say Cantor's loss means the end of immigration reform in the foreseeable future. Halimah Abdullah of CNN writes that immigration reform already was a longshot before Cantor lost, and the campaign for it should continue.

The Chicago Sun–Times, too, says the campaign for immigration reform is separate from the campaign for Virginia's Seventh District House seat.

I agree, mostly because what O'Neill said is still true. All politics is local, especially in House districts, which are divided up based on population. Except for those rare cases in which a state's population is so low that it only qualifies for a single at–large representative in the House — and there are currently seven of those — House seats are about as local as it gets in Washington.

The House of Representatives is known as the "People's House" because its membership is intended to reflect the people's will and conduct the people's business — and what I am hearing from Seventh District residents is that Cantor essentially forgot the people he represented. He wanted to be speaker. He wanted to be a player on the world stage.

That is something that Graham did not do. Graham and Cantor are similar in their politics. In the past, they've had the support of self–described Tea Party voters, and there was talk that their support for immigration reform alienated Tea Party voters.

But on Tuesday, as I say, Graham easily won renomination. Every political analyst I have seen regards his seat as safe in November's general election.

I don't dismiss the influence of the Tea Party any more than I dismiss the influence of any other politically active group. What I am saying is that any incumbent — in either party — who is not perceived as a public servant is going to have trouble, especially in this political climate.

Cantor paid the price for that perception, and now Republicans will choose a new majority leader next week.

That is the lesson incumbents should be taking from this.