Showing posts with label 2000. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2000. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 31, 2014

Remember the Y2K Scare?



How naive we were as we approached the new year 15 years ago.

In the days leading up to New Year's Day 2000, there was this overwhelming anxiety about what would happen to the nation's computers when asked to shift correctly from 1999 to 2000. Apparently, the storyline went, computers hadn't been programmed to handle a situation in which all four digits of a year changed.

Which made me wonder ...

Personal computers were still relatively new in 1999. It was still news in those days when someone established an online presence. Online shopping may be pervasive today, but then it was still a new thing for many people. Prior to Y2K, I can recall an intensive effort by many businesses to encourage people to shop online — but I honestly don't recall now if it was encouraged during the Christmas season of 1999.

Perhaps it required too much courage in the face of all the doomsday predictions that were circulating.

My point is, the developers of the personal computer were considered the best and the brightest of their generation. Weren't they bright enough to know that the year 2000 was coming up?

All sorts of apocalyptic scenarios were proposed in the days leading up to New Year's Day, causing considerable fear among the many Americans for whom personal computers were still new and intimidating things. I'd like to think that people have learned since then, but sometimes you have to wonder.

As they apprehensively approached the dawn of a new millennium — which was incorrect, too, but I long ago reached the conclusion that I wasn't going to win that argument — many of those Americans believed they could engage in any behavior that suited their whims and remain completely anonymous online or that, by simply pressing delete, they could permanently remove embarrassing or incriminating comments or photographs. Unfortunately, it appears some people still do.

Well, anyway, back to New Year's Day 2000.

Remember what happened? Nothing. Well, that isn't completely true. As I recall, there were a few very minor glitches — the kinds of things that wouldn't raise any eyebrows today. But lots of people took it seriously.

Businesses, too. Somehow some folks got the idea that they could avoid any problems if they switched off their computers before midnight on New Year's Eve, then switched them back on the next day.

Which made me wonder ...

If computers really weren't programmed to accept a four–digit year change, what made those people think it would behave any differently when power was restored to it? What was so special about having the power off at midnight? It still wouldn't be programmed to accept a four–digit year change.

It did seem like the logical evolution in thought from those who, when forced to deal with video issues on an old–fashioned TV that needed rabbit ears to pick up signals, responded by hitting it on the side. Aside from maybe knocking loose some of the TV's innards, I couldn't figure out what they hoped to accomplish.

Maybe people lost their ability to reason because we weren't changing one digit or even two. We were changing all four digits — and people approached New Year's Day 2000 (dubbed "Y2K") with more apprehension than they did Mayan Calendar Day a couple of years ago.

"Of course, it wasn't long before it became clear that all the fears associated with the turn of the millennium were for naught," wrote TIME's Lily Rothman.

Well, I guess it's a good thing we don't have to worry about a computer revolt at midnight this year. If you don't buy into the end–of–days scenarios, the next generation that will have to worry about issues surrounding a millennium change won't begin to show up for more than 900 years.

Happy New Year.

Sunday, June 24, 2012

Choosing a Running Mate



With the primaries over and the battle for the Republican presidential nomination apparently decided, political writers find themselves in an historically dreary period until the parties gather for their conventions.

It is at this time when there is much speculation about the ultimate identity of at least one of the major parties' running mates.

Of course, in 2012, we already know the name of one of the running mates. That would be Joe Biden, the incumbent vice president.

Four years ago, it was a much less common situation — in which no incumbent was running — so there was a great deal of speculation regarding the identities of both party nominees' running mates.

But this year, as I say, we already know who will be the running mate on the Democrats' ticket — unless, as a few folks have predicted, Barack Obama decides to drop Biden and put Hillary Clinton on his ticket.

I have argued repeatedly that this is highly unlikely. In their zeal to whip up a discussion about a non–issue, such observers show an appreciation only for drama, not history.

Realistically, only Republican Mitt Romney will be selecting a running mate in this election cycle.

Recent speculation about Romney's eventual running mate has focused, as usual, on the most well–known names — but history tells us that presidential nominees, in what is often described as their first presidential–level decision, are likely to surprise just about everyone — perhaps spectacularly so.

I believe the reason for that is, while it is always possible that a vice president could become president at any time, presidential nominees don't tend to treat the decision with the kind of reverence it deserves.

Don't get me wrong; it's an important decision, but the overriding consideration is usually political — which potential running mate can give the ticket the most bang for the buck on Election Day?

Thus, the decision offers a fascinating glimpse into the logic of the nominee, but, as a barometer for the kind of decisions he might be likely to make in office, it is virtually worthless.

Like four years ago.

There was a lot of speculation about the running mates Obama and John McCain would choose, but, in the end, the selections of Biden and Sarah Palin were complete surprises — and seemingly motivated by entirely different considerations (even though both choices came down to politics — as usual — no matter how the campaigns chose to spin the decisions).

They addressed weaknesses — either real or perceived — of the presidential nominees.

Domestically, in 2008, there had been concerns about gas and food prices, but there were also international tensions that summer, and foreign policy was an area in which McCain, a Vietnam–era prisoner of war, was believed to have an advantage.

As a presidential candidate, Biden hadn't attracted much support, and he came from a tiny state that was already believed to be in the bag for the Democrats, but he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and, as such, he brought foreign policy credibility to the Democratic ticket.

So, while conventional wisdom holds that a running mate is chosen in large part because of the votes he can bring or the states he can help the nominee carry, that didn't appear to play much of a role in Obama's decision. The selection of Biden was praised because it was believed to have addressed an administrative need, not an electoral one.

But it was political in the sense that it was designed to reassure voters who saw the war on terrorism and border security as the most crucial issues in 2008 (remember, when the Democrats convened in Denver, the economic collapse had not yet happened.)

McCain's apparent motivation in selecting a female running mate, on the other hand, was to appeal to the millions of women who had supported Hillary Clinton's campaign and were said to be lukewarm on Obama.

It was an electorally motivated decision, and it was seen for the transparent maneuver that it was. The Republicans entirely overlooked the fact that women who participated in the Democratic primaries had an ideological agenda, too. Palin was simply too extreme for most of them.

In fact, after the votes had been counted, I heard several people second–guessing McCain's choice. They argued — correctly — that there were centrist Republican women who could have had broader appeal to female voters.

(Most of those people, it is worth noting, had nothing but praise for Palin when she was chosen and during the campaign.)

But, on the other hand, Palin had to be extreme to keep the conservatives in line. There was already a widespread perception of McCain as a "RINO" (a "Republican in Name Only"), and he needed to give the conservatives a reason to show up at the polls.

Also — although it was hardly mentioned — Palin was the only candidate who, as a governor, brought executive experience to the table.

Traditionally, there are many factors involved in choosing a running mate, most aimed at providing some kind of balance to the ticket. Everyone has shortcomings, and the philosophy behind running mate selection has emphasized minimizing them.

As I said, Palin's executive experience carried some weight with voters who saw nothing but legislative experience from Obama, McCain and Biden.

In 2004, John Kerry apparently felt party unity was the most important factor so he chose North Carolina Sen. John Edwards to be his running mate.

Edwards had been Kerry's chief rival and the second–leading vote getter in the Democratic primaries — even though he won only two. It must have been a disappointment indeed for the Kerry team when their candidate received virtually no post–convention bounce in the polls. I'm sure they expected something, if only from the disgruntled Democrats whom they sought to appease.

Party unity never seemed to be a factor when George W. Bush made his choice in 2000. In fact, he appointed Dick Cheney to lead his vice–presidential search committee, but then Bush took the remarkable step of asking Cheney himself to be his running mate.

Had party unity been at the top of Bush's concerns, he probably would have picked McCain, his main rival for the nomination, to be his running mate.

Party unity apparently was behind Ronald Reagan's selection of George H.W. Bush in 1980.

Things got a little out of hand at that year's Republican convention. A rumor that former President Gerald Ford would be Reagan's running mate swept through the delegations like wildfire.

The idea was that Ford and Reagan, who had waged a bitter campaign for the GOP nomination four years earlier, would be co–presidents.

But negotiations broke down, and the dream ticket never came to fruition. In the end, Reagan picked Bush, who had been his chief rival for the nomination that year.

One of the longest–standing considerations in choosing a running mate has been geographical. The idea was to attract votes in states and/or regions that the presidential nominee might not otherwise get. I'm inclined to think that was more important in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but, with the rapid emergence of technology in the last 50 or 60 years, geographical factors have become less important.

Certainly Bill Clinton, in 1992, did not feel it was necessary to select someone who would provide geographical balance.

He chose Al Gore, a senator from Tennessee, one of the states that borders on Clinton's home state of Arkansas. Perhaps Clinton wanted to double down on his Southern credentials; most Southern states, after all, had only voted for Democrats once, perhaps twice, in the previous 30 years.

Also, with two Southerners on the ticket, the Bush campaign could not portray either candidate as a Northern liberal like previous Democratic candidates (i.e., George McGovern, Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis), and Gore's military service negated criticism Clinton had received on that during the primaries.

In his memoir "My Life," Clinton said of Gore, "I liked him and was convinced that he ... would be a big addition to our campaign."

Sometimes personal chemistry trumps everything else.

Presidential nominees choose their running mates for reasons that probably wouldn't occur to most people.

In 1968, Richard Nixon reportedly was so impressed with Spiro Agnew's speech placing his name in nomination that he offered him the second spot on the ticket.

Agnew was virtually unknown outside his home state of Maryland, but Nixon believed Maryland could be his beachhead in the South.

Nixon didn't carry Maryland in 1968, but he did carry five Southern states as he introduced the Southern strategy to modern American politics.

And, in 1964, Barry Goldwater picked New York Rep. Bill Miller to be his running mate because Miller was known to be the congressman who annoyed Goldwater's opponent, President Lyndon Johnson, the most.

There will be a lot of talk in the next two months about who will run with Romney in the fall, and the names you're likely to hear the most are the rising stars in Republican circles — Marco Rubio, Bobby Jindal, Chris Christie and others.

But don't be surprised if, when the smoke clears, someone you never heard of is standing on that podium with Romney in late August.

Sunday, December 12, 2010

Head for the Mountains



Back before George W. Bush's father was Ronald Reagan's running mate, "Head for the mountains" was the commercial pitch for Busch beer.

It may well have been the perfect advice for those who opposed Bush's ascension to the presidency in 2000.

If you were around in those days, I guess I don't have to remind you of the national ordeal that Americans went through in the five weeks between Election Day and this day, when the Supreme Court, after narrowly voting to halt the recount in Florida, effectively awarded the state — and, with it, the election — to Bush.

Recrimination was in the air long before the Democrats took a severe beating on Election Day last month, but it only makes sense, really, to put blame where it rightfully belongs — on the doorsteps of the five U.S. Supreme Court justices who halted the Florida recount with Bush narrowly leading Al Gore.

I suppose things started innocently enough. Bush's initial lead over Gore in Florida was less than 2,000 votes. Percentage–wise, the margin was narrow enough to qualify for a state–mandated machine recount.

That recount only took a few days. When it was done, though, Bush's lead had dwindled to a few hundred votes, and Gore requested a manual recount in four counties that typically voted for Democrats.

The recounts began, but they were being held in heavily populated counties, and officials feared the recounts could not be completed in time to meet the state's seven–day deadline for certifying election results. The Florida Circuit Court decided that the certified results had to be submitted by the deadline, but amended returns could be submitted later.

As it turned out, one of the counties completed its manual recount before the deadline. The recounts continued for the other three.

Well, one thing led to another. There was a lot of wrangling on both sides, a lot of hyperbole on both sides. There were legal challenges and counter–challenges.

The concept of "every vote counts" seemed to have been lost in the pursuit of victory at any price.

And, through it all, there was the concern that the next president needed time to make his transition. January 20, after all, was less than six weeks away.

In his memoir "My Life," the outgoing president, Bill Clinton, wrote, "If Gore had been ahead in the vote count and Bush behind, there's not a doubt in my mind that the same Supreme Court would have voted 9–0 to [re]count the vote and I would have supported the decision. ... Bush v. Gore will go down in history as one of the worst decisions the Supreme Court ever made, along with the Dred Scott case."

It was a terrible decision. Eventually, it may be seen to have caused as much — or nearly as much — damage to the nation as the Dred Scott case to which Clinton referred.

Sunday, November 7, 2010

The Election That Wouldn't End



If you're over 20 — and you weren't stranded on a desert island 10 years ago — you must remember what happened on this day in 2000 — or, at least, the series of events that were set in motion on this day.

I am speaking about the 2000 presidential election — the closest election, at least in terms of the electoral vote, in more than a century and, ultimately, one of only a handful of presidential elections in American history in which the winner of the popular vote was not the winner of the electoral vote.

In the history books, it all comes down to the dispute over the state of Florida. I guess it is accurate to say that although there were some smaller states that remained too close to call for another day or two. The fight for the Florida electors was the one that decided the election.

After most states had been called for either candidate on that Election Night, Vice President Al Gore was only a few electoral votes away from victory. But one big state, Florida, remained too close to call. If it went to Texas Gov. George W. Bush, the son of the former president, he would be the president–elect.

The initial count gave Bush a narrow lead, and the networks declared the state — and, consequently, the election — in Bush's favor, but the networks soon withdrew their projections when the outcome proved to be inconclusive.

It turned out the vote was close enough that a state–mandated recount was necessary, and that led to a bizarre parade of almost surreal images from Florida — of poll judges meticulously examining paper ballots for "hanging, dimpled or pregnant chads" that might provide some clue as to the intentions of the voters.

About five weeks after the voters went to the polls, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that the originally certified results, which had narrowly favored Bush, should hold. Consequently, Bush won the state's electoral votes and the election, but Gore won the popular vote.

As I say, the history books give Florida center stage in the drama, a slot it certainly did occupy throughout November and into December in 2000, but it is erroneous to believe that Florida alone decided what happened.

In no particular order
  • Ralph Nader was blamed by some for Gore's defeat, particularly in Florida.

    As Columbia University's Dr. Manning Marable observes, most of Nader's support was thought to have come at Gore's expense. In Florida, where Nader received nearly 100,000 votes while Gore lost the state to Bush by a few hundred, that prospect was particularly tempting for the role of scapegoat.

    In Florida, Democrats muddied the waters by alleging that the combination of Nader's presence on the ballot and some confusing voting procedures in some counties, like the "butterfly ballot," produced unique problems.

    But Marable observes that Nader received most of his votes in states that were not competitive, and Marable asserts — correctly — that Gore was largely responsible for his own defeat.

    Gore's home state of Tennessee voted for both him and his father in Senate races, and it voted for the Clinton–Gore ticket twice in the 1990s. But, in 2000, Gore lost Tennessee by four times as many votes as Nader received there.

    It was the first time in nearly 30 years that a major party's presidential nominee had failed to carry his home state.

    Gore also lost the state of West Virginia, which had not voted for a non–incumbent Republican since it voted for Herbert Hoover in 1928. It has now done so twice in the last 10 years, but, in 2000, the only Republicans who had carried West Virginia in the previous 72 years were incumbents seeking re–election — Eisenhower in 1956, Nixon in 1972, Reagan in 1984.

    As Marable pointed out in 2001, "Had Gore carried either his own home state, or even West Virginia, he would be president today."
  • I'm not sure, however, if I agree with Marable's assessment of the three things that were at the heart of Gore's defeat — his decision to distance himself from Bill Clinton, his inability to address the concerns of those who voted for Nader and what Marable called "the bankruptcy and failure of the 'New Democrat' strategy."

    On the first point, I definitely agree. Gore declined to use what may have been the most valuable campaign asset he had — his boss, President Clinton.

    A decade later, Clinton is still second to no one, not even the current president, at energizing a Democratic crowd — but, in 2000, he was still the president. He had presided over a budget surplus. He had a 60% approval rating.

    And Air Force One — and all the other props that come with the presidency — were still his to use.

    Gore may well have been squeamish about utilizing Clinton so soon after his impeachment trial, during which his relationship with a White House intern played an unseemly role, but he was not the pragmatic politician that Clinton was if he failed to recognize Clinton's value on the campaign trail.

    And, as a result, I tend to think he may never have had the qualities of a good president to begin with.

    Jacob Weisberg, writing in Slate the day after the election, agreed it was a mistake not to "embrace the accomplishments record of the Clinton administration."

    Weisberg also criticized the Gore personality, which was criticized earlier in his political career as wooden. To me, he seemed more relaxed as vice president, but, when he sought the presidency in 2000, Weisberg wrote, "There's something about Gore's public personality that's just plain hard to take."

    While I supported Gore in that election, I have to admit that there is a certain amount of truth in that. If nothing else, it seems to explain Weisberg's third criticism, which was "[i]n the wake of a successful centrist presidency and the best economy in memory, Gore adopted an angry populism as the tone of his campaign. Michael Kinsley aptly characterized this stance as 'You've never had it so good, and I'm mad as hell about it.' "

    It did seem uncomfortably inappropriate, Gore's justification for distancing himself from a president who brought prosperity to the nation but set a bad example in his personal behavior.

    I'm also inclined to agree with Marable that Gore failed to address the concerns of the Nader constituency. He largely underestimated it and, as Marable observes, ignored it.

    But I'm not sure I agree that the "New Democrat" strategy was bankrupted by 2000, merely eight years after it was unveiled. Perhaps it depends on your perspective.

    I don't think the message was faulty. Perhaps it was the messenger.
In hindsight, yes, the Bush administration was a disaster for this country.

Was Gore at fault? Yes, to a certain degree.

Was Nader at fault? Not as much as some would have you believe.

More than anything, it seems to me the 2000 election was an argument against the continued use of the Electoral College.

If the president had been chosen strictly on the basis of the popular vote in 2000, Gore would have won. He received more than half a million votes more than Bush — and joined a rather exclusive club of presidential candidates who won the popular vote but lost the electoral vote.